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Migration Decision and Rural Income Inequality in Northwestern China 
                                                               
Abstract: This paper examines the decision between internal migration and home 
production for rural households and its impact on rural income distribution. By 
constructing counterfactual scenarios under which households are allowed to switch 
freely between internal migration and home production, this study finds that the migrant 
households in the studied region could have earned more had they choose not to migrate 
and work in local sectors, given the results that show remittances earned by the migrant 
households are less than their simulated home production earnings. The findings also 
illustrate that there would also be less income inequality in this area if migrants choose to 
work locally. These results are compatible with the fact that the internal migration in the 
study area is very likely to be involuntary, due to the lack of arable land and insufficient 
local nonfarm job opportunities, usually provided by township and village enterprises.  
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1.1   Introduction 
       Internal rural-urban migration in China has become a highly noticeable social and 
demographical phenomenon since the beginning of the economic reform in 1978. Urban 
areas, especially large cities, have been developing disproportionately, which is the 
consequence of the unbalanced domestic development strategy focusing on urban 
industrialization since 1949.
1
 This rural-urban divide and growth disparity motivates 
huge amounts of rural surplus laborers to seek jobs in urban areas for both pecuniary and 
nonpenuciary payments. A migrant worker in China can be defined as a rural laborer who 
works in urban area but does not have a formal urban resident identity, or urban hukou.
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Thus, migrant workers are treated very differently from urban workers in terms of 
remuneration, both by the government and by the urban employers. They receive lower 
wage than their equally-productive urban colleagues, and are often excluded from the 
basic social security programs.  
       As the world’s largest floating population, the number of the Chinese migrant worker 
was 180 million at the end of the 1990s. In 2012, this number has exceeded 250 million,
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and it has been predicted that the number of migrant workers will continue to increase 
swiftly, reaching approximately 300 million by 2015 (Yang, 2009). Most of the migrant 
workers are low-skilled young workers with limited educational attainment. These 
                                                 
1
 The adoption of this development strategy reflects the doctrine of learning from the Soviet Union and  
Stalinist Communism. Mao believed that the heavy machinery sector should always be the first priority in 
economic development to enhance the national defense. 
2
 China’s modern hukou System (Household Registration System) started in 1950. It divides residents 
formally into rural residents and urban residents based on their residence and biological kinship. 
3
 Reported in China Statistic Yearbook by the National Bureau of Statistics of China. 
3 
 
workers are employed mainly in mining, manufacturing, construction and low-skilled 
service sectors which often require intensive physical work.  
        The characteristics of the Chinese migrant workers can be attributed to both rural 
labor supply and demand. On the supply side, China has 674 million rural residents, with 
more than 150 million registered rural households. Traditional rural Chinese household 
makes fertility decision that aims at maximizing the household’s productivity, thus girls 
are often discriminated against and boys with more physical working abilities are 
preferred. On the other hand, the “one-child policy” is difficult to implement in many 
rural areas due to the lack of monitoring and judicial resources, so rural households often 
choose to have multiple children. Children within one household would naturally 
compete for limited parental cares and educational resources with their siblings. Poorly 
educated parents and undeveloped rural school system can also adversely affect the 
children’s intellectual development and school performance, especially those children 
who are left behind. The result is high dropout rates and low average educational 
attainment. 
        On the demand side, shortage of arable land has always been a binding constraint on 
agricultural production in China (Zhu and Luo, 2009). As reported annually by the 
Ministry of Land and Resources, China’s arable land per capita has been declining for 
more than 10 years. In 1997, arable land per capita was 1.58 mu, and this number 
declined to 1.38 mu in 2011.
 4
 This is not only because of the increasing rural population, 
but also because of the shrinking amount of total arable land due to urban sprawl and 
                                                 
4
 1 mu = 667 m
2
 
4 
 
environmental deterioration. Adoption of advanced agricultural technologies and 
machineries in some area leads to a high marginal product of labor, which also decrease 
the demand for agricultural laborers. When both rural farm and nonfarm sectors are 
unable to absorb all these redundant laborers due to limited capacity, migrating to urban 
areas becomes the only option to seek better pecuniary payments for these rural surplus 
laborers. Urban firms have strong incentive to hire these migrant workers who would 
accept a much lower wage relative to their equally-productive urban counterparts.  
       Internal migration is not barrier free and costless, especially for the relatively poor 
households. Successful migration often requires contacts, know-how and some capital or 
at least the ability to borrow (Davin, 1998). In China, transportation costs are high for the 
undeveloped areas that are remote and inaccessible. Living costs (rents and utility fees) in 
urban areas are also increasing due to the long-lasting domestic inflation. 
       One of the most important social welfare issues in cotemporary China is the income 
inequality in the rural area. The Gini coefficient of the rural area is 0.39 in 2011, very 
close to 0.4, which is the recognized security line of uneven distribution.
 5
 Large income 
inequality in China often induces severe hierarchical conflicts between the rich and the 
poor, resulting in discrimination against the poor, crimes against the rich and distrust of 
the government. While most of the minority population resides in rural areas, income 
inequality across different minorities can even create secessionism which may threaten 
national security. Thus, rural income inequality can significantly affect the social stability 
in China via different channels and should receive some serious inspections. Remittances, 
                                                 
5
 Reported by the National Bureau of Statistics of China. 
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defined as money transmitted to rural households by migrant workers (Adams, 1989), are 
very likely to change the income distribution in the source communities. Hence, 
examining the possible effects of remittances on rural income inequality is critical to 
explore the welfare implication of internal migration, and can also provide useful 
guidance for policy makers who aim at constructing a more stable and harmonious 
society.  
       Using data from a poverty monitoring survey of rural households in Gansu and Inner 
Mongolia province in northwestern China, this study contributes to the existing literature 
by performing quantitative analyses on remittances and income inequality in this area for 
the first time. This region is worth studying because it is geographically and 
economically different from other macroregions in China (Naughton, 2007), which can 
lead to significant differences in the household decision between migration and home 
production. Findings show that while initially less-endowed migrant households are 
better off by sending out migrant workers and receiving remittances in absolute term, 
they can actually be even more economically improved if they choose to work in local 
sectors, assuming such job opportunities are always available. Also, to reduce the overall 
income inequality in this region, local government should focus either on increasing 
migrant workers’ net earnings in the urban area, or on creating more local job 
opportunities.  
        The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 illustrates the importance of 
remittances for rural households and provides a brief review of some representative 
empirical evidence. Section 3 presents the methodology used for estimation and 
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simulation. Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 reports and interprets the estimation 
and simulation results. Section 6 focuses on inequality analysis and policy implications. 
Section 7 concludes.  
 
2.   Remittances in Rural China and Literature Review  
        In China, it is conventional for migrant workers to send or bring part of their annual 
earnings back to their rural households as remittances. Prior studies showed that the 
remittances share of total household income is generally low in Asian countries. One 
study on 12 villages in northern India finds that the average remittance share in total 
household income is 6.9% (Tumbe, 2011). Other studies on Thailand, Malaysia and 
Indonesia find even lower remittance shares (Zhou, 2006). China, however, has a much 
higher remittance share than other Asian countries due to both economic and cultural 
reasons. Migrant workers, under the influence of collectivism culture, possess a strong 
sense of responsibility to earn both pecuniary and non-pecuniary resources for their 
family members. The remittances also serve as an income smoothing tool by diversifying 
the source of income for rural households, especially for those households whose income 
depends solely on farming activities, which is very sensitive to natural conditions. As 
reported by the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP), the overall remittances 
share in total migrant household income in China is 30%-50%. Remittances serve as a 
critical source of rural household expenditures on education, job training, medical care 
and daily life.  
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       Remittances, as a critical part of the total household income, can also affect the rural 
income distribution conditional on the position of the migrant households in the income 
spectrum. If the first households to make a migration decision are from the upper end of 
the income distribution, they are more likely to receive high returns from this high-risk 
“investment” (Taylor, 1986). However, if the households who choose to migrate are at 
the lower end of income distribution and are forced to do so because they have surplus 
laborers that cannot be absorbed by the local labor market, the remittances earned by 
these migrant workers may help the migrant households to catch up with their wealthier 
nonmigrant neighbors and the local income inequality could be reduced.. 
       Stark (1986) takes remittances as an “extra” net income of the migrant households 
that has no substitutes if migrant households do not participate in migration. Adams 
(1989) issued a study on remittances and inequality in rural Egypt, in which he criticized 
and improved the Stark approach. The Adams approach no longer conceives remittances 
as purely exogenous, but treats remittances as a substitute for home production earnings, 
which highlights the existence of the opportunity cost of migration. Enlightened by the 
Adams approach, Bradford and Boucher (1995) further contribute to the research of this 
topic by the improving the methodology. They formally introduce the migration 
participation equation, which enables them to control for the sample selection problem 
(incidental truncation) when estimating the impact of remittances on rural household 
income. The theoretical framework on this topic came to its maturity before studies on 
rural China started in the late 1990s.  Zhao (1999) first conducted a case study on 
migration decision and earning differences in Sichuan province in southwestern China. 
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He finds that earnings received by migrant workers are much higher than what they 
would receive as workers in local farm or nonfarm sectors. But internal migration in the 
studied area has high fixed costs. Du, Park and Wang (2005) restudied this issue using 
data from four western provinces. They observe that the rural policy reform initiated in 
the late 1990s benefits rural households disproportionately, in the sense that the poorest 
rural households still find migration extremely costly, while middle-class rural 
households benefit a lot from lower agricultural taxes, more transportation subsidies, 
better working conditions and higher labor insurance coverage. Thus, migration can 
enlarge income inequality under this scenario. Zhu and Luo (2009) study the impact of 
migration on income inequality in Hubei province, situated in central China. In their 
sample, nonmigrant households have richer land resources and higher initial household 
wealth, but remittances received by migrant households are more than home production 
earnings of nonmigrant households, thus participating in rural-urban migration is both 
individually and socially optimal.   
 
 
3.   Data Description 
       The data used in this study comes from a China regional poverty monitoring survey, 
lasted consecutively from 1999 to 2004. The survey was supported by the World Bank 
and conducted jointly by the National Bureau of Statistics of China and the China 
Poverty Relief Office in Gansu and Inner Mongolia Province, which are two large and 
less-developed provinces in northwestern China (See Appendix 1 for a poverty map). The 
9 
 
dataset actually used is a two-period pooled cross sectional dataset composed of the 2001 
and 2004 survey (Wave 3 and Wave 6).
6
  
      The 2001 and 2004 survey covered 700 and 1500 rural households, respectively. The 
surveyed households were located in 150 administrative villages in 15 poverty-stricken 
counties, subject to independent random sampling with no time or spatial correlation 
between two years. This sample is representative of the low-income rural population in 
this region, which is the population of interest in this study. Among the 700 households 
surveyed in 2001, 295 households participated in rural-urban migration, while the other 
405 households did not. Among the 1500 households surveyed in 2004, 633 households 
sent out at least one migrant worker, while the other 867 households opted to stay in rural 
area. The share of the migrant households in 2001 and 2004 was 42.1% and 42.2%, 
respectively. All the 928 migrant households in the sample received a strict positive 
amount of remittances, while the 1272 nonmigrant households received no remittances.          
      The survey provides quite comprehensive household level information, but does not 
collect detailed individual information for every member in the household. The numbers 
of household laborers in three age brackets (age 16-30, age 31-50 and older than 50) are 
used to control for household’s age structure. We use the number of household members 
with an educational attainment above 9
th
 grade to control for household’s education level 
and unobserved preference for education. In rural China, children receive governmental 
subsidies that cover part of their expenditures on education until 9
th
 grade. After 9
th
 grade, 
                                                 
6
 The data of this program is non-public and can only be used by authorized personnel. The 2001 and 2004 
data were released for pedagogical purposes, other data remains undisclosed and is unavailable upon 
request. An introduction of the program in Chinese can be found at http://www.wl.cn/895306.  
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they are no longer eligible for the benefit and the households will face a different budget 
constraint if they make further investment in child education. So household’s education 
preference can be revealed by the number of relatively well-educated members in the 
household. Table 1 reports the mean of the key variables for the full sample and for the 
two subsamples characterized by migration decisions.  
         
 
        Table 1 Selected Descriptive Statistics 
     All  
     Households 
Nonmigrant  
Households 
Migrant 
Households 
Total Household Income (CNY)
 ***
     9648.75     10646.29                        8284.62           
Laborers of Age 16 to 30
***
     0.61       0.47            0.79 
Laborers of Age 31 to 50
*
    0.76       0.74            0.79 
Laborers of Age above 50
***
    0.55       0.49            0.62 
Members with Schooling above 9
***
    0.16       0.18            0.14 
Members with Job Training
**
    0.14       0.16            0.13 
Arable Land Area (m
2
)
 ***
    1933.98       2458.99              1209.79 
Number of Children under 6
**
 
Remittances (CNY)
 ***
 
   0.34 
   1157.84 
      0.44 
      0 
            0.19 
             2744.87 
Home Production Earnings (CNY)
 ***
    7622.53      8638.29              4592.16 
Number of Observations    2200      1272                           928 
      Note: (1) 1 CNY = 0.16 USD 
                 (2) Home production earnings are defined as earnings from local units, including both the  
                       income from farming activities and the income from being employed by local enterprises. 
                 (3) 
***
Difference significant at 1% , 
**
significant at 5%, 
*
significant at 10% 
           
         
 
       It is shown that migrant households in this sample are poorer than nonmigrant 
households with 28.5% less total household income on average. Migrant households have 
68.1% more young laborers with age between 16 and 30, but own 103.3% less arable 
lands than nonmigrant households on average. Migrant households also receive less 
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education and vocational training. These are important indicators that migrant households 
in this sample are initially less endowed and might be forced to participate in migration 
by sending out surplus laborers. The fertility decision of nonmigrant households to bear 
more children further reflects that they are located at the upper half of the income 
distribution. 
 
 
4   Estimation Strategies 
       The substituting relationship between home production earnings and remittances is 
plausible for the rural households in China, which verifies the applicability of the Adams 
approach. Participating in migration always incurs a high fixed cost and is typically 
considered as a critical alternative for working at home, including both farm and nonfarm 
productive activities (Zhao, 1999). Because most of the migrant workers are young males 
with relatively high physical working ability, the household would have to face a large 
decline in the household productivity if it chooses to send out a migrant worker (Li, 
2011). Thus, there are obvious opportunity costs of getting remittances.  
        In this study we admit the fact that households must sacrifice some positive amount 
of home production earnings to participate in migration and receive remittances, and vice 
versa. Two economic counterfactual groups are created. In the first group, the 928 
migrant households are assumed to be nonmigrant households and receive home 
production earnings instead of remittances. In the second group, the 1272 nonmigrant 
households are assumed to be migrant households and receive remittances at the expense 
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of some home production earnings. Thus remittances and home production earnings are 
treated as substitutes, which is the core of the Adams approach. These constructions are 
based on the assumption that rural households would always make working decisions 
between migration and home production, so there are no idle laborers, which is not 
implausible given the working motivation and ability of the rural young laborers in China.  
      In the first counterfactual group, we know the income of the actual 1272 nonmigrant 
households, but not the potential home production earnings for the 928 migrant 
households. Therefore this part of (counterfactual) income for the migrant households 
needs to be simulated. By the same argument, we need to simulate the potential 
remittances for the 1272 nonmigrant households in the second counterfactual group. By 
comparing the income level and income distribution of the actual group with those of the 
two counterfactual groups, we can determine whether participating in migration is the 
first-best choice for migrant households, and symmetrically, whether staying in rural 
areas is optimal for nonmigrant households. 
7
 
        To simulate the home production earnings under the first counterfactual scenario, 
the unbiased estimators of the coefficients of the nonmigrant household income model 
are required. The nonmigrant household income model takes a linear form and is written 
as 
                      log(Yi
nr
)  = ρDi +βXi + δDiGi + ei                                          (1) 
                                                 
7
  An alternative approach is to use propensity score matching, which requires many details to be filled in 
such as how to model the score and how to do inference. However, the implementation of matching is not 
yet standardized and different researchers might reach very different conclusions, even when using the 
same data and covariates (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). We thus believe regression should still be the 
starting point for this work. 
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where Yi
nr 
is the total household income for household i, the superscript nr indicates that 
all households are assumed to be nonmigrant households and receive no remittances. Di 
represents the year dummy set to one if the household was surveyed in 2004, to allow for 
different intercepts for two periods. Xi is a vector of control variables, including 
household’s information on initial endowments and its demographics. Gi is a subset of Xi 
and contains variables that may affect household income differently across the two 
periods, such as educational level and job training. ei is the disturbance term. Because we 
are now in the first counterfactual scenario, the actual Yi
nr
 is unknown for the 928 migrant 
households. We first estimate the actual nonmigrant subsample with 1272 observations to 
get the unbiased coefficients for the income equation, and then apply these coefficients to 
predict the home production earnings for the 928 migrant households, giving their 
characteristics. Since the nonmigrant households might be self-selected into home 
production activities, this subsample estimation may incur the sample selection problem 
which may prevent us from obtaining unbiased estimates. Following the Heckman’s two-
step method for selection bias correction, a participation equation that incorporates the 
exclusion restrictions is estimated, to test for the existence and magnitude of potential 
sample selection bias. The participation equation is written as: 
                                 Ri
  
= ρDi +αZi+ δDiKi +vi                                                     (2) 
Ri is the home production dummy which equals unity if the household engages in home 
production and receives no remittances, and equals 0 otherwise. Zi is a vector of 
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exogenous variables that contains all the control variables in Xi and some variables that 
affect household’s home production decision but not their income directly. Ki contains all 
the variables in Gi plus the exclusive restrictions. The Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR) λi is 
then calculated from the participation equation and added into Equation (1) as a regressor, 
which yields: 
                                        log(Yi
nr
)  = ρcDi +β
c
Xi + δ
c
DiGi +λi + ui                         (3) 
The selection-bias-corrected coefficients ρc,βc and δc can now be used to simulate the 
deterministic part of potential home production earnings for migrant households. For the 
unobserved residuals, a random value is generated based on the observed error term of 
nonmigrant households: 
                                          μi = φi Φ
-1
(r)                                                                  (4) 
where φi is the estimated disturbance of nonmigrant households, r stands for a random 
number between 0 and 1, and Φ-1 is the inverse of the cumulative probability function of 
the standard normal distribution (Zhu and Luo, 2009).  
        The estimating process is much the same for the second counterfactual group in 
which all households are assumed to be migrant households. We acquire unbiased 
coefficients of the wage equation from the actual migrant subsample and apply those 
coefficients to simulate the unknown household income for nonmigrant households, 
assuming they received some remittances. The migrant household income model takes 
the form: 
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                                     log(Yi
r
)  = ρDi +βXi + δDiGi + ei                                                           (5) 
Yi
r
 now stands for the total household income with superscript r indicating all the 
households are now assumed to be migrant households. Using the actual migrant 
household subsample with 928 observations, a first stage migration participation equation 
is estimated, the inverse mills ratio is then calculated and added into Equation (5), which 
yields: 
                      log(Yi
r
)  = ρwDi +β
w
Xi + δ
w
DiGi +λi + ui                      (6) 
       Subsequently, the selection-bias-corrected coefficients ρw, βw and δw are used to 
simulate the potential remittances for nonmigrant households. Unobserved residuals are 
constructed using the observed residuals of migrant households and following the same 
procedures in the first counterfactual.  
 
5.  Estimation Results 
       We first examine the counterfactual scenario in which all households are assumed to 
be nonmigrant households, and receive some positive amount of home production 
earnings. This counterfactual scenario is designed to explore whether migrant households 
would earn more had they chose to and work locally and not to migrate. Table 2 presents 
the selected estimation results for Equation (2). Recall that the econometric purpose of 
estimating this equation is to obtain the inverse mills ratio for the subsequent selection-
bias correction. Furthermore, the estimators can be used to verify the demographic 
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patterns of migrant households (and symmetrically nonmigrant households), 
complementary to the sample statistics in Table 1. 
        The number of adult laborers is shown to be negatively related to the probability of 
engaging in home production, regardless of the laborers’ age. This relationship can be 
well-explained by the large amount of surplus laborers in rural China area at all age 
levels. Since rural industrial sectors are undeveloped and have very limited capacity to 
absorb surplus laborers, rural-urban migration is the only option for surplus laborers to 
get a job with better payment. Hence, for an average rural household, more laborers often 
imply a higher probability of sending out migrant workers.  
      The positive relationship between the number of relatively well-educated members 
and the probability of home production is consistent with the fact that migrant households 
are less educated on average in the studied area, which can make them disadvantageous 
in competing with nonmigrant households on local resources. Rural job training programs 
serve as a less costly substitute for formal education for these migrant households. These 
vocational training programs mainly focus on low-skill service jobs, such as truck driving, 
mail sorting and haircutting (Li, 2011). The trainings are fairly job-oriented and most of 
the trainees can be employed in urban servicing sectors after they graduate, resulting in a 
larger proneness of participating in rural-urban migration. 
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                        Table 2  Results of the Home Production Participation Equation 
        Coefficient          Std. Error 
   
Laborers of Age 16 to 30           -0.46
***
             0.05 
Laborers of Age 31 to 50           -0.82
***
             0.07 
Laborers of Age above 50           -0.32
***
             0.07 
Members with Schooling above 9            0.64
***
             0.11 
Members with Job Training           -0.99
***                      
            0.29 
Marriage (=1 if married)            1.12
***
             0.25 
Number of Children under 6          - 0.08             0.06 
Arable Land Area (m
2
)            0.0005
***
                0.0001 
Distance to the nearest bus station            0.26
***
             0.06 
Distance to the nearest town center            0.12
***
             0.05 
Year (=1 if surveyed in 2004)           -3.06
***
             1.31 
Constant            4.06             0.52 
Observation            2200  
Log-likelihood           -662.61  
Pseudo R
2
            0.25  
                       Note: (1) Other control variables include interactions of year dummy with  
                                       education, training, arable land, and two distance variables. 
                                 (2) Standard errors in parentheses; 
*
 significant at 10%, 
**
 significant at 5%,  
                                                           ***
 significant at 1%.    
                                 (3) The two exclusion restrictions passed the F-test for weak instruments  
                                       with a F statistic of 13.26.              
 
        Households who possess more arable land tend to input more human capital 
resources in home production, especially in farming activities. In China, lands are 
nationalized and non-tradable. The only way for rural households to obtain arable land is 
to sign the land leasing contract with local government through the “Housing 
Responsibility System”. Thus, households cannot purchase or sell arable lands to change 
their initial “land endowment” in the short run. Lastly, marriage tend to keep the workers 
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stay in rural area, while number of young dependents does not seem to affect one’s 
working decision significantly. 
        The exclusion restrictions used in the participation equations (the first stage of the 
Heckit Method) are the distance to the nearest bus station and the distance to the nearest 
town center. In the two surveyed provinces, infrastructure, including the road system, is 
extremely undeveloped, due to historical and geographical reasons. Thus the 
transportation cost is fairly high for migrant workers, considering their circulatory pattern. 
This indicates that the distance to the nearest bus station and town center can 
substantially affect household’s migration decision, which is proven by the positive and 
statistically significant results in Table 2. It should be admitted that, in theory, these two 
distance variables could be expected to affect rural household income. But the surveyed 
area is remote and home production is largely characterized by traditional and autarky 
agriculture, so it is economically valid to ignore the feeble influences that the distance 
variables might have on household incomes through channels other than internal 
migration. Test of overidentifying restrictions is shown in Appendix 2.    
        Table 3 reports the selected estimation results of Equation (1) and Equation (3) for 
the subsample composed of 1272 nonmigrant households, with and without the IMR. The 
statistical significance of the inverse mills ratio indicates the existence of the sample 
selection bias, albeit the fact that the selection-bias corrected coefficients are not 
substantially different from the basic OLS coefficients. The positive IMR coefficient 
indicates that the nonmigrant households are above average in their unobservable 
characteristics with regard to the migrant households in the sample. Most of the 
19 
 
statistically significant results are consistent with the economic reality in rural China. 
More laborers lead to more household income, while the middle-aged laborers (often the 
household heads) tend to contribute the most to the household income. The number of 
young dependents has negatively affects the household income. More arable lands are 
indicators of higher yields from home production, which naturally results in higher 
household income. Job training and marital status show no significant impacts on 
household income in this sample. 
          Table 3  Selected Results of the Nonmigrant Household Income Model   
                                                                       OLS without IMR                     OLS with IMR    
                                                                            Equation (1)                           Equation (3) 
Laborers of Age 16 to 30                               0.02           (0.02)                    0.07
***
       (0.02)                                                                                                            
Laborers of Age 31 to 50                               0.17
***
       (0.02)                    0.15
***
       (0.03) 
Laborers of Age above 50                             0.14
***
       (0.03)                    0.12
***
        (0.03) 
Members with Schooling above 9                 0.11
***
       (0.03)                    0.11
*** 
       (0.03) 
Members with Job Training                         -0.05           (0.31)                   -0.09           (0.31) 
Marriage (=1 if married)                              -0.21
***
       (0.06)                   -0.14           (0.09) 
Number of Children under 6                        -0.13
***
       (0.03)                   -0.13
***
       (0.03) 
Arable Land Area (m
2
)                                  0.0003
***   
(0.00004)               0.0003
*** 
   (0.0004) 
Year (=1 if surveyed in 2004)                      -0.17
**
        (0.08)                   -0.26
**             
(0.12) 
Inverse Mills Ratio                                        N/A            N/A                      0.25
***
        (0.07)            
Constant                                                         8.95
***         
(0.87)                     9.05
** 
         (0.15) 
Observation                                                   1272                                        1272 
Adjusted R
2                                                               
           0.34                                         0.34 
            Note: (1) Other control variables include interactions of year dummy with education and training,      
                      (2) Standard errors in parentheses; 
*
 significant at 10%, 
**
 significant at 5%, 
***
 significant at        
                           1%. 
         
        The selection-bias-corrected coefficients from Equation (3) can now be applied to 
predict the potential total household income for the 928 migrant households had they 
received some home production earnings instead of remittances.  
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        For the second counterfactual group in which all nonmigrant households are 
assumed to be  migrant households, the estimation results for the first-stage migration 
participation equation are exactly the same as the results from Equation (2) in magnitudes, 
but with opposite signs, because the only change is the dependent dummy variable, which 
now equals 1 if household participated in internal migration. Analogously, the inverse 
mills ratio is obtained and added into the second-stage household income regression as an 
independent variable. 
        Table 4 presents the selected estimation results of Equation (5) and Equation (6) for 
the 928 observed migrant households, with and without the IMR. 
          
           
          Table 4   Selected Results of the Migrant Household Income Model  
                                                                       OLS without IMR                     OLS with IMR    
                                                                             Equation (5)                            Equation (6)    
Laborers of Age 16 to 30                               0.09
***
       (0.02)                       0.11
*** 
      (0.02)                                                                                                            
Laborers of Age 31 to 50                               0.11
***
       (0.03)                       0.15
***
       (0.03) 
Laborers of Age above 50                              0.11
***
       (0.03)                       0.14
***
      (0.03) 
Members with Schooling above 9                 0.19
***
        (0.04)                      0.28
*** 
      (0.03) 
Members with Job Training                          0.03            (0.05)                     -0.09           (0.31) 
Marriage (=1 if married)                              -0.09            (0.19)                      0.05           (0.09) 
Number of Children under 6                         0.003          (0.14)                     -0.13
***
       (0.03) 
Arable Land Area (m
2
)                                  0.0002
***     
(0.00004)                0.0003
*** 
   (0.00004) 
Year (=1 if surveyed in 2004)                      -0.24
**
         (0.14)                     -0.27
*               
(0.19) 
Inverse Mills Ratio                                        N/A            N/A                        -0.42
***
       (0.09)            
Constant                                                        10.45
***         
(0.31)                      11.68
*** 
     (0.46) 
Observation                                                   928                                             928 
Adjusted R
2                                                               
          0.32                                            0.32 
            Note: (1) Other control variables include interactions of year dummy with education and training,      
                      (2) Standard errors in parentheses; 
*
 significant at 10%, 
**
 significant at 5%, 
***
 significant at  
                           1%. 
 
21 
 
         Sample selection bias is similarly obvious for migrant households given the 
statistical significance of the inverse mills ratio. By comparing the magnitude of the 
coefficients in Table 3 and Table 4, it is clear that the effect of the number of laborers on 
household income is largely the same for both migrant and nonmigrant households. Same 
argument applies for the effect of arable land areas on household income. This confirms 
that migrant households are not less productive than the nonmigrant households on the 
margin or facing a structurally different production function. For them, the most plausible 
reason of a lower household income is they could not make the surplus laborers more 
productive by allocating them to local jobs. 
      The selection-bias-corrected coefficients for the migrant household income equation 
can now be applied to predict the potential household income for nonmigrant households 
had they received remittances at the expense of less home production earnings. Table 5 
reports the household income for the actual sample and the simulated household income 
for the two counterfactual samples.
8
 
 
                
 
               Table 5   Average Household Income in Three Scenarios 
   Total Nonmigrant Migrant 
Actual Sample 9648.75   10646.29 8284.62 
Counterfactual 1 10228.31   10646.29 9655.37 
Counterfactual 2 8931.42    9403.31 8284.62 
                                                 
8
 The simulations are based on the assumption that migrant households would have the same marginal 
productivity in home production as nonmigrant households, and vice versa. This assumption is arguable 
and the simulated income of nonmigrant households could be underestimated, because in the sample, they 
are better endowed and more likely to be well-informed and risk-resilient, which could make them earn 
more from migration than the actual migrant households. Symmetrically, the simulated income of migrant 
households could be overestimated. 
22 
 
            The reported numbers suggest that migrant households could earn 16.5% more on 
average by switching to local jobs. In contrast, the nonmigrant household income would 
drop by 11.7% if they chose to participate in internal migration. Overall, the entire region 
is better off with higher total household income if counterfactual 1 is realized. It should 
be noted that the reported results ignore the human capital accumulation of the migrant 
workers and the long-run effect that migration might have on the development of the 
source areas. It has been documented that migrants may bring back to the home country 
increased skills and knowledge that could only be picked up in cities but are transferable 
to the home environment (Stark et al. 1997). But it is more likely that it will be high-skill 
individuals working in creative and dynamic sectors of the economy that will contribute, 
upon return, to the development of the home areas (Rosenzweig, 2005). Hence, the 
results should still be reliable given the fact that most of the migrant workers in 
northwestern China are low-skilled individuals. 
       We next present evidence that shows the switching from internal migration to home 
production is not only individually optimal, but also socially desirable in terms of income 
distribution. 
 
 
1.6   Inequality Analysis and Policy Implications 
        Income inequality is studied by decomposing the Gini coefficient into three easily-
interpretable terms, following the seminal works by Lerman(1985) and Stark(1986). The 
differences between these inequality indicators of the observed group and those of the 
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two counterfactual groups can be used to illustrate the impact of different job choices on 
rural income distribution, while also provide evidences for its underlying reasons.  
    We write the Gini coefficient for rural household income as a function of the 
covariance between income and its cumulative distribution, which is: 
                                                          
            
 
                                            (7) 
where   is the Gini coefficient of total household incomes for all the 2200 surveyed 
households.      is the cumulative distribution of total incomes  , and   denotes the 
average income for 2200 households. Utilizing the properties of the covariance, Equation 
(7) can be written as 
                                               G 
 

K
k 1
            
 
 = 

K
k 1
SkGkRk                (8) 
Where Sk is the share of income component k in total household income, i.e. Sk =yk/y; Gk 
is the Gini index corresponding to income component k; and Rk is the Gini correlation of 
component k with total income. Equation (8) enables us to decompose the role of 
remittances and home production earnings in inequality into three terms: 
(a) Sk  : the magnitude of remittances/home production earnings relative to total income; 
(b) Gk : the inequality of remittances/home production earnings, and 
(c) Rk : the correlation of remittances/home production earnings with total income. 
           Table 6 shows the results of Gini decomposition for the three groups. The first 
panel of Table 6 shows the result of the traditional Stark (1985) approach where we can 
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obtain a measure of the overall impact of remittances upon village income inequality. 
Total Gini coefficient is at the level of 0.33. The remittances are distributed quite 
unevenly across migrant households, with a Gini coefficient of 0.74. Referring to the 
third panel, the simulated remittances are even more unequally distributed, with a Gini 
coefficient of 0.9, and the total income distribution with Gini coefficient of 0.4 is 
significantly less desirable than the actual income distribution with a Gini coefficient of 
0.33.  
 
Table 6  Decomposition of the Rural Household Income Inequality 
 
Counterfactual Group 1 
Remittances                                       N/A                        N/A                              N/A                                N/A 
Home Production Earnings               0.91                        0.34                              0.90                                0.28 
Other Income                                    0.09                        0.41                              0.49                                0.03 
Total Income                                     1.00                        0.31                              1.00                                0.31 
 
Counterfactual Group 2 
Remittances                                       0.72                        0.90                              0.32                                0.21 
Home Production Earnings               0.19                        0.51                              0.88                                0.17 
Other Income                                     0.09                       0.41                              0.45                                0.02 
Total Income                                     1.00                        0.40                              1.00                                0.40                                
 Note: Other income is calculated by subtracting remittances and home production earnings from  
           total household income. 
        
     
                                                      Share in                Gini  for                   Gini correlation              Contribution to  
                                                   total income     income component         with total income            Gini coefficient 
                                                         (S)                         (G)                                 (R)                               (SGR) 
Observed Group 
Remittances                                       0.12                        0.74                              0.02                                 0.04 
Home Production Earnings               0.79                        0.41                              0.90                                 0.28 
Other Income                                     0.09                       0.41                              0.42                                 0.01 
Total Income                                     1.00                        0.33                              1.00                                 0.33 
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        With a dominating share of 72% in the total income, remittances now contribute 
0.21, which is over 50%, to the total income inequality. The second panel shows that 
without the income component of remittances, the Gini coefficient would drop to a more 
desirable level of 0.31. A 0.02 decrease in the Gini might not be of strong economical 
importance, but an increase of the Gini from 0.33 to 0.4 can surely be devastating. The 
results confirm that by switching from migration to home production, the entire region 
would be better off (or at least remain stable) in terms of income distribution, and more 
importantly, we should expect to see a sizable increase in the income inequality if more 
households choose to participate in rural-urban migration.  
         Home production earnings are highly correlated with the total household income in 
all the three scenarios, with the Gini correlation around 0.9, indicating that these earning 
opportunities are not well-diffused across the entire region and are only taken advantage 
of by those at the upper end of income distribution. Internal migration, instead, is widely 
accessible in the studied region with a Gini correlation of 0.02 in the observed sample. 
This further suggests that households are taking migration as an alternative when local 
jobs are unavailable. 
       Given the above findings, two types of policies should be designed to increase the 
total average income and to decrease the income inequality in the studied area. The first 
is to aim at achieving the first-best outcome by encouraging households to participate in 
home production. However, this outcome can only be obtained when rural laborers are 
allowed to switch freely between home production and migration. Since the agricultural 
land endowments of rural households are fixed in the short run due to institutional 
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reasons, as discussed above, many rural laborers cannot participate in agricultural 
production due to the lack of land. Moreover, the rural low-skill service industries have 
very limited capacity to absorb surplus laborers. Thus, surplus laborers of migrant 
households can hardly switch to home production due to the binding constraint of limited 
agricultural resources and local job opportunities. This constraint also tends to result in a 
low marginal return to labor input on home production for migrant households, by the 
law of diminishing marginal returns. Policies of this type should focus on creating equal 
opportunities for rural households to participate in home production, mainly by 
developing township and village enterprises (TVEs). TVEs have been proved to be 
efficient in absorbing rural surplus laborers since most of them are very labor intensive 
(Naughton, 2007). TVEs often cluster to focus on the entire processing industry for 
agricultural products in the target area, which can add sizable extra values to agricultural 
products. Rural household can increase their incomes by selling fresh agricultural 
products directly to the TVEs at the contracted prices, which also reduce the market risk 
they may encounter.
9
 
        The second set of policies, which is more enforceable in the short run, should focus 
on increasing remittances for the migrant households, mainly by increasing migrant 
workers’ nominal earnings and reducing their migration costs. There are two general 
ways to increase migrant worker’s earnings in China: increasing their wage rate and 
preventing them from being cheated by the employer. The latter case is by no means a 
                                                 
9
 The Chinese central government issued the “Decision on accelerating the development of the TVEs in 
middle and western region” in 1993 to officially confirm the benefits and encourage the development of the 
TVEs. See http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/b/bf/200207/20020700031377.shtml for the complete policy. 
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trivial one in reality. Every year, large number of migrant workers suffers from delayed 
payments and even no payments due to the dishonesty of their employers and little legal 
protections they can rely on. Most of the migrant workers have no knowledge on law, so 
it is the government’s responsibility to guarantee a legal employment contract to be 
signed before any de facto employment takes place. Employers should be legally 
convicted and punished for their dishonest and unlawful behaviors. 
         The government is also responsible for reducing the costs of migration, chiefly by 
reducing the living cost and the transportation cost. In China, the largest part of the living 
cost for migrant workers comes from the housing rents in urban areas. In the metropolitan 
areas such as Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou, the monthly rent of a common 
apartment is very likely to exceed a migrant worker’s monthly earnings, resulting in the 
formation of urban slums with poor and unhygienic living conditions for the occupying 
migrant workers. Thus, government should invest more in constructing the “economically 
affordable house” which is specifically designed for poor urban households and migrant 
workers. Migrant workers should also receive rent subsidies and transportation subsidies 
as received by less-endowed urban residents.
10
 
        It is important to note that these two types of policies are not mutually exclusive. 
They can function together to provide both the “equality of opportunity” and the 
“equality of outcome” for current migrant households in the surveyed area.  
 
 
                                                 
10
  The suggested policies are concerned by the “three-nong” problem since 2001 and are included 
explicitly in the 2004-2009 “No.1 Central Document” issued annually by the Chinese central government.   
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1.7   Conclusion 
        Internal migration in China after the economic reform has played a critical role in 
increasing household income level and changing income distribution in rural areas. 
Remittances are the most direct pecuniary rewards from migration, and serve as an 
important source of income for migrant households. However, there is no consensus on 
the impact of internal migration, since nonmigrant households and migrant households 
have very different initial endowments and face different job choice constraints in 
different areas, while the remittances and home production earnings they receive varies 
significantly across different regions. This is why most of the studies on this topic are 
place-based studies. 
        Using data from two large and undeveloped provinces in northwestern China, this 
empirical study finds that migrant households in this area are initially less endowed, and 
the remittances they received by participating in migration are lower than potential home 
production income they could have earned if they switched to home production. Thus, 
rural-urban migration is not the optimal decision for migrant households if they can 
switch costlessly to local jobs. The decomposition of the Gini coefficient also shows that 
encouraging internal migration is also not the first-best choice for a social planner if she 
aims to achieve a higher average income and lower income inequality in the studied 
region. Policies should be implemented to increase migrant worker’s remittances by 
increasing their nominal wages and reducing their migration costs, and protect their rights 
to be fully and punctually paid. More importantly, government should spend more 
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budgets on protecting existing arable lands and encouraging the development of the 
TVEs to absorb the surplus laborers more adequately in the studied area.  
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Appendix 1: Poverty Map of China 
      This poverty map is extracted from the World Bank GeoiQ System. It is shown that 
Gansu province and Inner Mongolia province located at the northwest part of China have 
annual per capita income below national average, especially Gansu Province. 
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Appendix 2: Test of Overidentifying Restrictions 
     Analogous to the test of the validity of overidentifying instruments in an 
overidentified model using the Hansen-Sargan test, we should perform an overidentifying 
restrictions (OIR) test in the Heckit model to account for potential biases that" can do 
more harm than good" ( Bound, Jaeger and Baker, 1995). The test is conducted by 
explicitly including the endogenous decision variable Ri into the structural income model 
and perform a Hansen-Sargan test, with the two exclusion restrictions (distance to the 
nearest bus station and distance to the nearest town center) treated as two instruments for 
Ri. The model takes the form: 
 
                              log(Yi)  = ρDi +γRi + βXi + δDiGi + ei                                 (A.1) 
 
Yi now stands for the total household income for all the 2200 surveyed households. In 
STATA we use the postestimation "estat overid" command following the "ivregress 
gmm" command to produce the Hansen-J statistic. The test statistic is χ² (1) distributed 
because the number of overidentifying restrictions is 1. The yielded Hansen-J statistic is 
1.604 and its p-value is 0.342. Thus we do not reject the null hypothesis and conclude 
that the overidentifying restriction is valid. 
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